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precisely the prohibition on wearing apparel that manifests the employee's religious affiliation that leads to the adverse treatment, namely her dismissal'.
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There was thus disagreement on whether bans on the wearing of religious symbols constituted direct or indirect discrimination. The difference is important because direct discrimination on the ground of religion or belief cannot be justified unless this is specifically provided for by Directive 2000/78/EC, while indirect discrimination can be objectively justified if there is a legitimate aim and the means used to achieve that aim are proportionate and necessary (Article 2(2)(b) of Directive 2000/78/EC). Both are further discussed below. In
Chez Razpredelenie, the CJEU explained that a practice constitutes direct discrimination if the protected discrimination ground (in this case ethnic origin) determined the decision to impose the treatment or if that measure proved to have been introduced and/or maintained for reasons relating to a protected discrimination ground. 22 Amnesty International and the European Network Against Racism (ENAR) conclude from this that 'it is undeniable that the measure imposed by G4S explicitly refers to religion or belief and introduces a difference of treatment on that ground'. 23 An employee who manifests his or her religion or belief by wearing a visible religious symbol or dress is treated less favourably than an employee who does not do so and thus 'the measure puts the former employee in a less favourable situation than the latter precisely on the grounds of religion or belief'. 24 They conclude that the ban imposed by G4S constituted direct discrimination.
It is suggested that the different opinions on whether there is direct discrimination are linked to the choice of comparator: direct discrimination is less favourable treatment compared to someone else, and therefore, to establish this, a comparison needs to take place. The CJEU and Advocate General Kokott compared Ms Achbita with other people who wanted to manifest their religion or belief through the wearing of religious symbols at work: since these people were also banned from doing so due to the fact that the ban applied to all visible signs without distinction and there was no less favourable treatment, Advocate General Kokott and 21 Ibid., footnote 81. 22 Academic opinion on this issue also appears to be divided. Vickers, for example, writes that 'both allegations of direct discrimination were, unsurprisingly, rejected. Discrimination based on a generally applicable dress code is not direct discrimination'. 28 Jolly expresses the view that 'a rule expressed neutrally on workplace attire or apparel is more likely to constitute indirect discrimination, unless there is evidence of particular stereotyping, prejudice or intent behind the rule which could lead it to be direct discrimination'. 29 Jolly does not elaborate further on this, as she focuses on justification, but she notes in a footnote, that Advocate General Sharpston's opinion that Ms Bougnaoui's dismissal amounted to direct discrimination 'without further factual explanation, appears faulty'. 30 Advocate General
Kokott also mentioned that 'if a ban such as that at issue here proved to be based on stereotypes or prejudice in relation to one or more specific religions -or even simply in relation to religious beliefs generally', then 'it would without any doubt be appropriate to assume the presence of direct discrimination based on religion. According to the information Here, I draw attention to the insidiousness of the argument, "but we need to do X because otherwise our customers won't like it". Where the customer's attitude may itself be indicative of prejudice based on one of the "prohibited factors", such as religion, it seems to me particularly dangerous to excuse the employer from compliance with an equal treatment requirement in order to pander to that prejudice. 39 Brems writes that it is bewildering that there is no reference in the judgment 'to either the indirect discrimination takes place when there is a neutral rule, which applies to everyone equally, but with which some people cannot comply because of their religion or belief. Such a rule will thus be unlawful unless it is objectively justified.
If read like this, then the rule applied by G4S would be indirectly discriminatory: it applies to every employee equally, but people who want to wear specific clothing or symbols for religious reasons cannot comply with it. This appears to be the reasoning behind the CJEU's decision in Achbita, that there was no direct discrimination. But if a rule can be seen as constituting indirect discrimination, then the way the justification test from Article 2(2)(b) of Directive 2000/78/EC is applied becomes important. In both Achbita and Bougnaoui, the CJEU pointed out that it was up to the referring court to ascertain whether there was direct or indirect discrimination. 41 However, in Achbita, the CJEU went on to provide guidance on indirect discrimination and on the justification test. As was mentioned above, this guidance could have provided for a very strict or for a very lenient justification test. The CJEU appears to have opted for the latter and has been criticized for doing so, as will become clear in the following paragraphs.
In Achbita, the CJEU held that 'the desire to display, in relations with both public and private sector customers, a policy of political, philosophical or religious neutrality must be considered legitimate' because it relates to the freedom to conduct a business as guaranteed by Article 16 of the Charter, notably where only those workers who are in contact with the employer's customers are covered. 42 The CJEU pointed out that this was supported by the case law of the ECtHR in Eweida and Others v. the UK, 43 which also allowed restrictions on the freedom of religion in pursuit of the aim of neutrality. 44 There was no further explanation as to why neutrality must be considered legitimate. Steijns criticizes the CJEU for focusing 41 on the freedom to conduct a business in Article 16 of the Charter, but completely ignoring Article 31(1) of the Charter, which determines that 'every worker has the right to working conditions which respect his or her (…) dignity'. 45 Solomon remarks that the aim of preserving religious neutrality is not mentioned in either Article 10 of the Charter, read in conjunction with Article 52 of the Charter, or in Article 9 ECHR. 46 In both Achbita and Bougnaoui, the employers were private employers. Spaventa criticizes the CJEU for not discussing the distinction between public and private employment or the views of the Belgian and French governments, the two governments directly affected by the rulings. 47 She points out that both the Belgian and the French governments sided with the claimants in these cases and drew a 'very conceptual limit to the principle of laïcité
[secularism] which is justified, in this view, because of the very nature of the State and its duty of neutrality, a duty which cannot be extended to private parties (or if so only exceptionally)'. 48 Brems also sees it as problematic that the CJEU 'accepts the expansion of neutrality into the private sphere without the least degree of scrutiny'. 49 She continues that extending neutrality to the private sector is 'a big leap' and that 'neutrality can be an easy cover-up for prejudice'. 50 Therefore, the CJEU in Achbita can be criticized for not explaining, in more detail, why a policy of neutrality for a private company can be a legitimate aim, although it did follow the opinions of both Advocates General in this regard. Advocate General Kokott, in Achbita, However, it is submitted that the CJEU should have scrutinized neutrality as a legitimate business aim more closely. For example, Advocate General Kokott pointed out that the neutrality rule was 'essential to avoid the impression that external individuals might associate with G4S itself or with one of its customers, or even attribute to the latter, the political, philosophical or religious beliefs publicly expressed by an employee through her dress'. 54 However, it can be questioned if this is really happening when an employee wears a religious (or indeed any other) symbol at work. Kokott did not bring forward or refer to any evidence that this was indeed taking place in practice. Jolly asks whether the fact that the CJEU mentioned that the rule would be justified if it was limited to customer-facing roles, means that other G4S employees do not believe that G4S religious neutrality is compromised but that other members of society are unable to make that distinction. She then writes that this is 'really quite an extraordinary assumption in a modern, diverse and plural society'.
55
If there is a legitimate aim, the next step is to assess whether the means used to achieve that aim are appropriate and necessary. The CJEU held that the ban on visible political, philosophical or religious signs, imposed by G4S in Achbita, was appropriate to achieve the aim of the policy of neutrality as long as that policy was 'genuinely pursued in a consistent and systematic manner'. 56 The CJEU referred to two of its previous cases here - Advocate General Sharpston, in Bougnaoui, followed a different approach, as she stated that, in the context of examining whether the right balance had been struck, the starting point must be that an employee has, in principle, the right to wear religious apparel or a religious sign but that the employer also has, or may have, the right to impose restrictions. 75 She then continued to suggest that it would not be unreasonable to require employees to do as much as possible to meet the uniform rule requirements. An employer could thus stipulate that employees wear a headscarf in the colour of the uniform or require the employee to wear the religious symbol discretely, where it is possible to do so. 76 Sharpston suggested that the employer and employee will need to explore the options together in order to arrive at a solution that accommodates both the employee's right to manifest his religious belief and the employer's right to conduct his business. Whilst the employee does not, in my view, have an absolute right to insist that he be allowed to do a particular job within the organisation on his own terms, nor should he readily be told that he should look for alternative employment. A solution that lies somewhere between those two positions is likely to be proportionate.
Depending on precisely what is at issue, it may or may not involve some restriction on the employee's unfettered ability to manifest his religion; but it will not undermine an aspect of religious observance that that employee regards as essential.
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Advocate General Sharpston added that, as a last resort, the business interest in generating maximum profit should, in her view, 'give way to the right of the individual employee to manifest his religious convictions'. 78 It is submitted that this is a much more nuanced approach to proportionality which leaves room for the weighing of all interests involved, of both employee and employer, in order to find a fair balance. It is also submitted that the CJEU should have followed this approach and should have opted for a strict justification test by scrutinizing the legitimate aim more closely and by conducting a much more nuanced balancing exercise, giving sufficient weight to the importance of the manifestation of their belief by the applicants. Instead, the CJEU appears to have opted for a finding of indirect discrimination and applying a fairly loose justification test. Much of the critique levelled against the judgment refers to this point. 79 More support for the application of a strict justification test can be found in the CJEU's previous case law. 80 First, the CJEU has consistently held that restrictions and limitations on individual rights in EU law, which include the right not to be discrimination against, should be interpreted strictly. 81 Second, the justification test for indirect sex discrimination has, real need; they must be appropriate to achieving the objective pursued and, they must be necessary to that end. 82 The latter includes considering whether there is an alternative, less discriminatory way of achieving the aim pursued. 83 This clearly means that the interests of the individual must be weighed in the balance. As the test for justification of indirect sex discrimination is worded in the same way as the justification tests for other discrimination grounds covered by the EU anti-discrimination directives, there appears to be no reason not to apply the same test to these other discrimination grounds, including that of religion or belief. This is supported by the fact that the CJEU is generally concerned with the uniform application of EU law and with a desire to avoid inconsistencies. This would, therefore, favour treating all discrimination grounds the same.
On the other hand, it can be asked whether religion or belief as a ground for discrimination should be treated differently from other grounds of discrimination. being given to the importance of being able to manifest this identity at work in the balancing which is required to assess whether indirect discrimination is justified. This would, as was submitted above, lead to a more nuanced and stricter justification test. It would also be in line with Article 31(1) of the Charter that 'every worker has the right to working conditions which respect his or her (…) dignity', as was mentioned before.
Advocate General Kokott also appears to favour giving a 'measure of discretion' to national authorities and in particular to national courts in applying the proportionality test, where she considered that the CJEU does not necessarily have to prescribe a solution that is uniform throughout the European Union. Rather, it would be sufficient, in my opinion, for the Court to indicate to the national court all of the material factors that it must take into account in carrying out the proportionality test but otherwise to leave to that court the actual task of striking a balance between the substantive interests involved.
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This is similar to the 'margin of appreciation' which the ECtHR uses to reflect national differences in cases pertaining to freedom of religion. Jolly points out that this 'has the effect of demoting religious discrimination among a hierarchy of protected characteristics'. 87 In other words, it would lead to less protection against religion and belief discrimination than the protection provided by EU law against other forms of discrimination. Vickers writes that this introduction of a margin of discretion raises particular concerns in the context of equality law, because equality has usually been developed to eradicate entrenched inequality. Given that it would seem inconceivable that a court would allow a state to argue that national traditions should be allowed to justify sex or race discrimination in employment, it is questionable whether such reasoning should be accepted in the different context of religion.
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Therefore, it is suggested that the CJEU should have applied the same strict justification test for indirect discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief as it applies to all other grounds of discrimination covered by EU anti-discrimination directives. Religion or belief, as a discrimination ground, should thus not be treated differently. The Open Society Justice
Initiative gives another, related reason why religion or belief as discrimination ground should not be treated differently from other grounds where it remarks that the CJEU 'should respect and build on its case law in other fields of discrimination to avoid serious impacts on protection from discrimination on grounds such as ethnicity, sexual orientation and sex '. 89 This refers to the possible effect of 'levelling down': applying a more lenient justification test for indirect religion or belief discrimination could lead to such a test also being applied to the other grounds covered by EU anti-discrimination law and thus to lowering the protection against indirect discrimination.
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More support for the argument that religion is not special or different can be found in the fact that the Council of the European Union has provided guidelines on freedom of religion or belief which state that 'persons holding non-theistic or atheistic belief should be equally occupational activities concerned or of the context in which they are carried out, such a characteristic constitutes a genuine and determining occupational requirement, provided that the objective is legitimate and the requirement is proportionate.
Therefore, the prohibition of discrimination does not apply where having a particular characteristic, including religion or belief, is a genuine and determining occupational requirement, subject to a justification test. In Achbita, the CJEU did not mention the genuine and determining occupational requirement at all; while it was rather brief in its considerations on this matter in Bougnaoui. The CJEU pointed out that, 'in accordance with Recital 23 of Directive 2000/78, it is only in very limited circumstances that a characteristic related, in particular, to religion may constitute a genuine and determining occupational requirement'. 92 It then considered that the concept of 'genuine and determining occupational requirement' in Article 4(1) 'refers to a requirement that is objectively dictated by the nature of the occupational activities concerned or of the context in which they are carried out. It cannot, however, cover subjective considerations, such as the willingness of the employer to take account of the particular wishes of the customer' and thus, the CJEU concluded that this was not a genuine and determining occupational requirement. . 96 She then stated that the work of a receptionist can be performed just as well with a headscarf as without one. 97 In other words, the nature of the job of receptionist did not require Ms Achbita to take off her headscarf. However, the context of the job could do so, because 'one of the conditions of carrying out that work may nonetheless be compliance with the dress code laid down by the employer (…) in which case the employee carries out her work in a context in which she must refrain from wearing her headscarf'. 98 Kokott then came to the conclusion that the ban imposed by G4S 'may be regarded as a genuine and determining occupational requirement within the meaning of Article 4(1)'.
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By way of contrast, Advocate General Sharpston expressed the opinion that the exception for occupational requirements 'cannot be used to justify a blanket exception for all the activities that a given employee may potentially engage in'. 100 Advocate General Sharpston stated that the wording of Article 4(1) reflected its narrowness: the occupational requirement must be both 'genuine' and 'determining' and this meant that 'the derogation must be limited to matters which are absolutely necessary in order to undertake the professional activity in question'.
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Therefore, the application of the derogation in Article 4(1) could not be justified by the commercial interest of the business in its relations with its customers. 102 Advocate General
Sharpston also pointed out that accepting the view of the employer would 'risk "normalising" the derogation' which 'cannot be right' as 'it is intended that the derogation should apply only in the most limited of circumstances'. 103 There was nothing 'to suggest that, because she [Ms Bougnaoui] wore the Islamic headscarf, she was in any way unable to perform her duties as a design engineer' and thus the requirement not to wear the headscarf could not be a genuine and determining occupational requirement.
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The CJEU thus followed the interpretation given by Advocate General Sharpston and concluded that the wish of a customer not to be served by someone in a headscarf was not a genuine and determining occupational requirement. This follows the CJEU's previous case law that derogations from the principle of equality must be interpreted strictly, as was mentioned above. This is to be welcomed, but it raises the question whether there is a tension between this and the acceptance, in Achbita, that the aim of neutrality can be legitimate aim.
As Peers writes, 'there is a thin line between saying that employee headscarves can't be banned just because customers ask for it on the one hand, and allowing employers to ban such clothing in effect due to anticipation of customer reaction'. 105 Jolly points out that 'Achbita begs the question of whether those customer's wishes suffice in order to bring about the neutrality rule in the first place'. 106 and 'as the test for justification of directly discriminatory measures ("genuine and determining occupational requirements") is so much more demanding than that for indirectly discriminatory measures, the reasons for the apparent contrast in the outcomes in the two cases becomes clear'. 108 It is suggested that this does not really assuage the tension between the two judgments.
§6. Conclusion
In this article, the first two judgments of the CJEU in relation to religion or belief discrimination, Achbita and Bougnaoui, have been analysed. Both cases concerned employees who were dismissed from their jobs when they refused to remove their Islamic headscarves at work. In Achbita, the CJEU concluded that there was no direct discrimination but that there could be indirect discrimination, which was for the referring court to decide.
However, the CJEU provided guidance on this. It held that a neutrality policy was a legitimate aim, as it was part of the freedom to conduct a business, guaranteed by Article 16 of the Charter. In considering whether the ban was appropriate and necessary, the CJEU held that the ban on visible political, philosophical or religious symbols was justified as long as the ban was genuinely pursued in a consistent and systematic manner and thus the CJEU did not make a distinction between different religions or different (religious, philosophical or political) beliefs; as long as the rule was limited to customer-facing employees; and, as long as the employer had considered whether the employee could be moved to a job without contact with customers.
In Bougnaoui, the CJEU held that the wish of a customer not to be served by someone in a headscarf was not a genuine and determining occupational requirement. It repeated that it was for the referring court to decide whether there was direct or indirect discrimination and it referred to its judgment in Achbita for the factors to be taken into account in deciding, if there was indirect discrimination, whether this was justified.
But what does this mean in practice? The judgments do not give employers the right to ban
Islamic headscarves or symbols of one particular religion only, so an actual headscarf ban would not be acceptable. The CJEU has made clear that any bans should cover all religious, philosophical and political symbols and thus would have to include skullcaps, crucifixes and turbans as well as clothing or badges with political or philosophical slogans. The judgment also makes it difficult for an employer to justify restrictions on clothing for those employees who do not come into contact with customers. Moreover, the fact that the CJEU has indicated that the employer should consider whether the employee can be moved to a job where he or she will not have contact with customers, indicates that there is some obligation on the employer to try and accommodate religious employees in another role within the company.
The rejection of customer wishes as a genuine and determining occupational requirement is also a very positive development.
McCrea acknowledges that 'what is seen as neutral is culturally specific and so compliance with neutral rules will be more difficult for adherents to minority faiths', but that 'it is not clear that any other option was open to the Court of Justice'. He concludes that 'the solution recognising the legitimacy of general bans but requiring that such bans avoid targeting specific faiths seems like a reasonable one'. 109 However, it is submitted that the CJEU had other options: as was argued before, there was support for a finding of direct discrimination and, even if the CJEU did not want to take that route, it could have applied a more rigorous justification test for indirect discrimination, as it does for indirect discrimination on other 109 Ibid.
grounds covered by EU anti-discrimination law. It has been argued that religion or belief as a ground for discrimination should not be treated differently from these other grounds because this would create inconsistencies and might lead to diminished protection against discrimination on all the grounds of discrimination covered by EU law. The CJEU could and should also have given more weight to the individual applicant's right to manifest their religion, a right that is guaranteed by Article 10 of the Charter. Moreover, as McCrea acknowledges, the judgment puts more obstacles in the way of minority communities and could have an effect on Muslim women especially 110 and it can be questioned whether this fits in with the founding values of the EU. Article 2 TEU declares that:
The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.
The judgments do not seem to give sufficient weight to the values of human dignity, the rights of persons belonging to minorities, pluralism and tolerance. As Silvestri remarks, At a time when Europe is short of big ideals and existing conflicts and demographic transformations indicate we need to pay more, not less, attention to freedom of religion and of expression, it does not help that such a prominent international court is unwilling to be bolder in dealing with these fundamental freedoms and the idea of tolerance. 111 Silvestri also points out that 'the ruling is likely to provide ammunition and political legitimacy to all those across Europe who are promoting anti-Muslim, anti-religious and antimigrant feelings'. 112 The CJEU could have taken the lead in providing strong protection
